NIE: Tehran's Choice Now

Besides kicking off a taboo-breaking debate in the U.S., the National Intelligence Estimate's conclusion that Iran shelved its nuclear weapons program four years ago should be an opportunity for Iranians to have a new discussion about the U.S. Iranian leaders, too, should re-evaluate how their past mistakes have contributed to the 28-year Cold War with Washington, and whether improving relations with the U.S. would serve Iran's national interests.

A few observations:

Death to the Great Satan! The revolutionary battle cry doesn't get much traction in Iran any longer. Sure, it makes for good television news footage or a good headline, but it resonates with perhaps no more than 15% of Iranians--approximately the percentage that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can count for his die-hard support. Iranian hard-liners and moderates have to start calculating the damage the rhetoric does to any hopes they have of fully normalizing Iran's relations with the West and particularly the U.S. As well as the damage that is done to its national interests by its provocative support for radical Arab groups like Hizballah and Hamas that help keep Arab-Israeli peace out of reach. If the U.S. can't expect Iran to respond to confused stick-carrot messages, nor should Iran expect American politicians to seek a rapprochement as long as Iran projects its militant face alongside its pragmatic one.

National interests. Nobody should expect a popular revolution like Iran's to leave no political wake. The nationalist and religious fervor stirred up by the overthrow of the shah and the internal and regional battles that followed made it difficult for Iran to have normal relations with the U.S. But nearly 20 years after the end of the destructive Iran-Iraq War, Iran has made extraordinary progress in establishing itself as a serious and semi-normal country. Despite the hue and cry over Ahmadinejad's remarks on Israel and the Holocaust, Iran has greatly improved relations with nearly every country except for the U.S. and Israel. Despite the nuclear controversy, Iran has a much better track record of cooperating with the IAEA than many other countries, including Israel. But if Iran hopes to continue that trend toward being a respected nation, it will have to make some hard choices about whether to unambiguously work toward a rapprochement with the U.S. With its nuclear brinksmanship, Iran may have come perilously close to being targeted for a U.S. attack, a scenario that would have done neither the world nor Iran any good. Iran still faces the prospect of tightened sanctions, a move led by the U.S. because of continuing fears about Iran's nuclear ambitions as well as its support for violent groups. All of Iran's political factions have much to gain by Iran's true return to the community of nations. The domestic battles in Iran should be over which politicians will take the necessary steps, rather than whether to take those steps.

Iranian moderates? Iranian politicians, to be fair, have probably engaged in a more thoroughgoing internal debate about whether to improve ties with the U.S. than American politicians have done vice versa. In Iran the risks of doing so are much higher, in fact, given the poisonous nature of Iran's domestic politics. Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the towering figures of the revolution, flirted with rapprochement as far back as the mid-'80s during Irangate, when Reagan White House envoys brought him a cake and a Bible amid the arms-for-hostages talks. During the Clinton administration, he sought to bring U.S. oil companies to Iran, only to be rebuffed by the White House. His successor Mohammed Khatami extended an olive branch to the "great American people" in a CNN interview early in his presidency, but feared a bolder move would provoke hard-liners opposed to his reform agenda. Then suddenly came Iran's offer of a "grand bargain" with the U.S. in 2003 that may have had the approval of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatullah Khamenei. Now the vindication that Iran claims in the NIE as well as the latest IAEA findings give Tehran a foundation to explore a particularly face-saving peace with Washington. Iranians should now fully absorb that while Cheney and hard-liners favor regime-change, Condi Rice, the Baker-Hamilton commission, Barack Obama and others have advocated dialogue with Iran.

The Amhadinejad Factor. Khatami's successor has done everything he could to exploit U.S. hostility to Iran for his own political popularity. There may be a danger that Ahmadinejad gloats too much about Washington's climb-down. In a television speech last week, he crowed that "a coup de grace was fired at all the dreams of the ill-wishers, and the righteousness of the Iranian nation was proved once again." Yet, even Ahmadinejad seems to see the limits of America-bashing's appeal among the electorate. In the last year or so, he has penned long letters to America in general and Bush in particular, complaining about U.S. policies, to be sure, but seeking to come off as a humanist who has America's future well-being at heart. It doesn't get much attention, because his hard-line persona is so indelible, but Ahmadinejad is on record advocating that the U.S. and Iran turn a page in their relationship. When I asked him in an interview in Tehran one year ago this week whether he regretted that the'79 hostage crisis stands in the way of better relations, he replied, "We have now 25 years behind us. We should think of the future, not about the past." When I asked him if we wanted to talk to the U.S. or not, he said, "I do believe that if the government of the United States changes its behavior, the conditions will be changed. Then a dialogue could take place." Now, Ahmadinejad has the chance to make a historic opening with Washington and get all the credit for it. GIven that better relations with the U.S. would be very popular among Iranians generally, that would help make him the man of the people he considers himself to be.

--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo