NIE: Washington's Choice Now

It's a heaven-sent gift: the stunning revelation in the National Intelligence Estimate Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that U.S. spy agencies believe that Iran shelved its nuclear weapons program four years ago.

There should now be a new, serious American debate about Iran. We should examine how misunderstandings have played a part in preventing past cooperation and perhaps even a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran. We should also look at whether the Islamic regime in Tehran is one that Washington can do business with now.

A few observations on these points:

Iranian Counter-Revolution. Neoconservatives around Cheney and some Iranian exiles would love to see the Iranian government overthrown. This is wishful thinking that betrays a complete lack of understanding about Iran's 1979 revolution.

"Bomb, bomb, bomb. Bomb, bomb Iran." Short of regime-change, many American hard-liners would like to put an economic stranglehold on Tehran and launch preemptive military strikes to destroy Iran's uranium-enrichment capability. Much more likely than not, this would enable the hard-line elements in Iran to strengthen their hand on the grounds that the nation is under attack from foreigners. Punitive measures against Iran may actually prolong rather than end destructive Iranian interference in regional affairs and domestic repression.

Facts vs. False Assunmptions. The NIE should be a wake up call to avoid basing Iran policy on assumptions--and the most paranoid assumptions, at that--rather than on a cool reading of the facts. Cheney & Co. have been banging the war drums largely on the basis that Iran was about to go nuclear--and that this would enable the bad guys in Tehran to dominate the rest of the Middle East. But the NIE says that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that this decision indicates that "it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005." Thus, it would have been a miscalculation of Iraq-War proportions, or worse, to have launched a massive strike on Iran to take out its nuclear program.

Iranian Pragmatists. The NIE supports the view that Iranian leaders are far more pragmatic as a whole than Washington has given them credit for being--in other words, they are not fanatical ideologues who cannot be reasoned with. The NIE said Tehran probably suspended its nuclear weapons and enrichment programs and allowed more intrusive international inspections in 2003 "primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure" resulting from the exposure of Iran's secret nuclear programs. This "suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously," the NIE said. More importantly, it indicates that "Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs."

Condi Rice's Half-Offer. In the past two years, with the cost-benefit model in mind, the Secretary of State has wrested the upper hand in making Iran policy away from Cheney. In May 2006, she issued a landmark statement in which she offered to negotiate with Iran if Tehran suspended its uranium-enrichment program. Compared to Cheney's preference for regime-change, Rice's offer was indeed a significant olive branch. Yet for Iranians watching the U.S. quagmire in Iraq, it did not offer very much in exchange for a major tangible Iranian concession. Rice merely offered to sit down at the table in existing talks between Iran and European countries over Iran's nuclear program. Iran, in fact, has been looking for a much more significant deal with Washington; not just the prize of talking to an American diplomat, but one that shows recognition of Iran's influence and stature in the Middle East.

Chance For a Grand Bargain? Iran's offer in 2003 of a so-called grand bargain following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq is evidence that influential elements in the Iranian regime are prepared to bargain seriously. It proposed many concessions from Iran's side. It offered acceptance of much tighter IAEA controls on Iran's enrichment program. In fact, later that year, Iran temporarily agreed to such controls by voluntarily accepting the IAEA's Additional Protocol. Just as significantly, Iranian diplomats offered tacit recognition of Israel, via support for the 2002 Arab peace initiative and restraining allies such as Hizballah and Hamas; support for U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq; and cooperation against Al Qaeda. In return, Iran demanded an end to U.S. hostility toward the Iranian regime, including acceptance of Iran, as the largest nation in the Gulf with 70 million population, as a regional superpower. Although the grand bargain was essentially ignored by the Bush administration, the NIE suggests that accommodating Iran's interests "security, prestige, and goals for regional influence" may be an effective way to convince Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons quest altogether.

Washington's Choice. Recognizing Iran as a major power in the Gulf will be a bitter pill for Washington politicians to swallow. The memories of the 1979 hostage crisis and Iranian involvement in subsequent terrorism against the U.S. are still fresh. Ally Israel will be alarmed, not only out of concern that U.S. cooperation with Iran might seem to be legitimizing Hizballah and Hamas, but fearing that a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement might eventually give Israel some competition in Washington's strategic affections. Washington's Arab allies are already worried that the NIE will bolster Iran's geopolitical fortunes. There are many problems, questions and doubts, but whether to pursue a grand bargain with Tehran is the choice that really faces the U.S. now.

--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo