What the IAEA Now Says About Iran's Nukes

The Bush Administration quickly seized on the latest International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran's nuclear program as further evidence that Tehran is not cooperating and must therefore be targeted for a third round of U.N. sanctions. The White House says that Iran is "stringing along the IAEA during this process."

Though citing disclosures that Iran still needs to make, the report describes a good deal of Iranian cooperation under an IAEA agreement to clear up questions about the clandestine origins of Iran's present nuclear program. The IAEA isn't satisfied that it knows everything to confirm that Iran has no secret plan to develop a nuclear weapon. It bluntly warns Iran that until it provides greater transparency by allowing more intrusive inspections under the IAEA's Additional Protocol, a political cloud will continue to hang over its nuclear efforts.

But the report stops well short of accusing Iran of stonewalling. The Israeli government lashed out at the report, saying that it "fails to expose (Iranian President Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad's intentions that are well known" to IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei. Iran hailed the report, insisting it proved that Iran has been truthful in its claim to be developing a program for energy rather that bombs. Ahmadinejad called on the West to "bravely apologize to the Iranian nation."

The nine-page report, which will be discussed by the IAEA board next week in Vienna, presents a detailed history of Iran's development of highly advanced technology for producing the fuel from enriched uranium needed for nuclear power reactors or atomic weapons. Citing information provided by Iranian officials and at times supported by IAEA inspections or independent sources, the report chronicles Iran's illicit efforts to obtain so-called P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology on the international black market, starting with "a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer for certain components and equipment said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary."

In nine instances, the report describes information and statements provided by Iran as being "consistent" with IAEA findings. It says that "the agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs are consistent with its findings." In the report summary, the IAEA says it had been able to verify that Iran had not diverted known nuclear material for other purposes, that Iran had provided the agency with required accountancy reports pertaining to declared nuclear material and activities and that Iran had provided "sufficient access" to nuclear officials and responded in a "timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications."

The report says, however, that the IAEA is continuing to verify Iran's declarations; to clarify still-unexplained uranium particle contamination at an Iranian technical university, to seek information about Iranian activities concerning polonium-210, which can be used to trigger a nuclear device, its Gchine uranium mine, and development of an enhanced P-2 centrifuge; and to explore other activities that could have military applications. The IAEA says that Iran should deal with such issues in the next few weeks. The report complains that Iran's current cooperation has been "reactive rather than pro-active."

The report cites a memo dated Feb. 28, 1987 that Iran provided as acknowledgment of the existence of its secret program, written by the then head of Iran's atomic energy organization to the then prime minister. The IAEA suggests that the memo recommended the purchase of the centrifuge technology and the prime minister approved the recommendation with an endorsement signature. Iranian officials told the IAEA that only the atomic energy organization, and no military institution, was involved in the birth of Iran's centrifuge program. The report says, however, that it had been unable to determine the originator of the 1987 memo.

The report says that the IAEA has not been able to confirm Iran's contention that "the supply network"--an apparent reference to Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's black market nuke operation--rather than Iranian officials had initiated a sale of new technology in 1993. But it says information about deliveries and technical assistance provided by Iran was verified by some of the network's operatives.

The agency concludes that based on interviews with officials from Libya, which utilized Khan's black market network as well, the 1993 offer involved P-1 technology that had originally been ordered by Libya but was diverted to Iran between 1994-96. The report says that Iran had provided names, locations and activities of the workshops involved in the domestic production of centrifuge components, most of which it says are owned by military organizations.

The report goes on to describe a covert meeting in 1996 in Dubai, where Khan maintained a front organization, in which Iranian officials were presented with a full set of P-2 centrifuge designs as compensation for the poor quality of P-1 centrifuge components purchased earlier. Iran told the IAEA that it initiated no work on the more advanced P-2 program until 2002, shortly before Iran's secret efforts were exposed by Iranian dissidents.

The report says the agency does not have credible procurement-related information that reveals the actual acquisition of P-2 centrifuges or components through the period. But after extensive inquiries, it expresses satisfaction with Iran's rundown of its declared P-2 program. Said the report: "Based on visits made by Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshop in 2004, examination of the company owner's contract, progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement enquiries, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D activities are consistent with the Agency's findings."

Regarding Iran's current activities, the report says the IAEA had verified that Iran crossed the threshold of putting 3,000 centrifuges into operation--in line with Ahmadinejad recent pronouncement that Iran had achieved the capacity for industrial-scale fuel production. Agency tests, however, indicates that the centrifuges are operating below capacity and below the level of Iran's public claims.

Noting that Iran remains in defiance of U.N. resolutions demanding that it suspend its enrichment program due to mistrust over Iran's intentions, the report urges Iran to reinstate its compliance with the IAEA's still-voluntary Additional Protocol. Because Tehran suspended compliance two years ago, the report says, "the agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing [and] as a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing."

That situation, the report suggests, undermines Iran's efforts to prove its good intentions. "Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program requires that the agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally important, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran," the report concludes.

Saying the IAEA "has no concrete information...about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran," the report says that "the agency is not in position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program."

--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo