The Crocker Assessment

The media buzz is all about General Petraeus's congressional testimony, but Ambassador Crocker's assessment is the more important one. There's no military solution to the problem in Iraq. Petraeus and his finest men and women can stay in Iraq for 100 years but they won't tame the country as long as the political factions and Iraq's immediate neighbors are still scrambling for power. There has to be a durable political solution and there is none in sight.

I felt Crocker was within good judgement to provide an assessment that basically sees the Iraqi glass as half full rather than half empty. I think he genuinely believes--and is probably correct--when he says that "Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems confronting them today." But what Crocker left unsaid at least explicitly is that successful nation-building in Iraq is a very long-term project and not one for the feint-hearted. The best experts on Iraq that I know reckon another five years at the least--and that was always way outside a time frame that the American political calendar would accept. The gap between the initial rosy predictions of quick results and the hard realities of Iraqi politics is one of the prime examples of the Bush administration's bungling of the war. Hence an able ambassador and public servant like Crocker is left to pick up the pieces.

Crocker is correct in saying that a significant amount of progress toward building a new political system in Iraq has been achieved. Yet, you have to get a little nervous when you hear Crocker reminding us that it took more than a century of acrimony and violence for American democracy to evolve into the post-slavery era. Given that Iraq has no Mandela, as Crocker pointed out, much less a Jefferson, I wonder what the time frame might be for the evolution of Iraqi democracy.

I didn't come away from Crocker's presentation entirely convinced that American military support is essential to Iraq's future. In Lebanon in 1982-84, and in Somalia in 1992-93, U.S. military involvement in civil wars achieved nothing. On the other hand, the almost total absence of even American diplomacy witnessed remarkable political agreements among warring parties in Israel/Palestine and South Africa in 1993. If Crocker is correct that an American withdrawal could result in internal civil war and regional chaos, it suggests that our military presence may be needed for years if not decades to come in order to prevent that from happening. On the other hand, if national reconciliation is what is needed to minimize the risk of all-out civil war, it's hard to see why Iraqis can't and shouldn't manage that challenge on their own if that is their true wish.

Crocker is decidedly above party politics. Yet in representing Bush in Iraq, he has inevitably become drawn into the administration's effort to salvage its colossal mistakes. Buying more time may help Bush exit office without experiencing a humiliating withdrawal from Iraq. But it is wrong to ask the troops for more sacrifices without leveling with Americans about what kind of longer-term commitment is really at stake and coming up with a sensible plan to get there. Thus far, the administration has proved either unable or unwilling to get Shiites and Kurds to offer Sunnis a meaningful stake in Iraq's future. And it has done next to nothing toward accepting two of the Baker-Hamilton commission's crucial recommendations about working with Syria and Iran.

Just as with its wishful thinking in invading Iraq four years ago, the White House seems to think that it can eradicate Iran's influence in the region simply by wishing it away. If Bush is sincerely thinking about solving the Iran problem by bombing Iran's nuclear program, then its hard to take seriously its appeal for a little more time to set Iraq on the path of democracy. War with Iran would simply send Petraeus's mission in Iraq into the realm of the unknown. If Americans are being asked to keep armed forces in Iraq, a little more coherence and transparency is in order.

Crocker made the best case possible as to why Bush's efforts in Iraq should be given more time, but I'll leave you with some of the more sobering caveats in his testimony:

--I will not minimize the enormity of the challenges faced by Iraqis, nor the complexity of the situation.

--The process will not be quick, it will be uneven, punctuated by setbacks as well as achievements, and it will require substantial U.S. resolve and commitment.

--There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory; any turning point will likely only be recognized in retrospect.

--Iraq is experiencing a revolution, not just a regime change... maintain a sense of realism about the challenges that remain.

--The past 18 months in particular have further strained Iraqi society.

--Extensive displacement and widespread sectarian killings by Al Qaeda and other extremist groups have gnawed away at the already frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics.

--It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is--and will remain for some time--a traumatized society.

--Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic and security challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq, but they are asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be governed, and how Iraqis will share power and resources among each other... much remains uncertain in law and practice.

--The Iraqi economy is performing significantly under potential.

--Insecurity in the countryside raises transport costs and especially affects manufacturing and agriculture.

--Electricity supply...is woefully inadequate in Baghdad. Many neighborhoods in the city receive two hours a day or less from the national grid.

--2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to unraveling politically, economically and in security terms. 2007 has brought improvement. Enormous challenges remain.

--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo