Washington & Tehran (2)

As Walter Isaacson's interview with Iranian diplomat Javad Zarif in TIME this week confirms, Iranian officials are keen to break the impasse and resume negotiations over Tehran's disputed nuclear program. This raises an interesting question about what transpired in the last round of talks-about-talks, held in Berlin last Sept. 27-28 between European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iran's Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Larijani. The end of those talks gave momentum to the successful U.S.-led drive to impose U.N. sanctions on Iran last Dec. 23.

When the Solana-Larijani discussions ended on Sept. 28, Solana was quoted saying the talks were "progressing" and that "We will have a new contact in the middle of next week." For his part, Larijani told reporters, "It has been a long, constructive negotiation. Today we have discussed modalities with the aim of coming back to the main negotiations as soon as possible." But six days later, Solana's tone became markedly more negative. He told the European parliament on Oct. 4 that despite the "endless hours" of negotiations, Iran had not made a commitment to suspend uranium enrichment, which he called the "key point" in the discussions. Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice had said that only if Iran suspended uranium enrichment--which the U.S. and other countries fear could be diverted to a nuclear weapons program-- could substantive negotiations take place--that the U.S. would join-- on a Western package of incentives concerning Iran's civilian nuclear power program.

Although it has been firmly denied by Solana's office, the State Department and British officials, Iranian officials are quietly insisting that they had reached an understanding with Solana that an 11-point "Gentlemen's Agreement"--rather than only Iran's suspension-- could serve as the basis for substantive negotiations. According to TIME sources in Tehran, Larijani believes he had a deal with Solana when they parted on Sept. 28 but that Solana backed off under pressure from Washington.

If there was a deal, Lariani didn't get it in writing. But what's interesting is how Larijani seems to be caught in a squeeze. Solana failed to confirm any understanding from his talks with Larijani or support it if there was one; at the same time, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly rejected one of the main concessions Larijani had offered in the talks, a temporary uranium-enrichement suspension as a goodwill gesture.

It seems to me that Larijani was doing his best to finesse a way of resuming substantive negotiations, but he was undercut by inflexible positions in the West and at home as well. True, leaking word of a "Gentlemen's Agreement" might have been a negotiator's ploy, perhaps hoping to divide the so-called 3+3--Britain, France and Germany, and Russia, China and the U.S. But, according to TIME's sources in Tehran, Larijani--who owes his appointment to Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei-- is among the pragmatists willing to accept keeping Iran's enrichment program at a limited, symbolic research level rather than moving to industrial production in order to win political benefits from the West. That's in contrast with the black-and-white thinking of Ahmadinejad and his followers, who are willing to risk international sanctions and even the threat of a U.S. military strike in their stand on principle.

Thus Larijani's continued interest in re-starting the talks, and Zarif's proposed scenario for doing that, indicate that there may well be a promising readjustment in Iran's thinking underway due to the U.N. sanctions. No doubt Iran's regime continues to constitute a danger--in its nuclear ambitions, its support of militant Islamic groups opposed to peace with Israel--but there is also a danger in ignoring diplomatic openings that can alter the political landscape. The question may become whether the U.S. and its partners take Iran up on it, or continue to demand Iran's complete capitulation. U.N. sanctions may have caused a re-think in Tehran, but one has to wonder if unyielding pressure will see Iran forswearing its nuclear rights or taking its nuke programs underground (or further underground). One undeniably positive aspect of Iran's nuclear behavior is that it continues to be a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is subject to the IAEA's monitoring regime. Short of all-out war with Iran, it may be difficult to prevent Iran from stirring up the kind of trouble in Iraq that the U.S. claims it already is stirring up. Sources of mine are telling me about a recent incident in which an Iranian submarine moved too close for comfort in waters near Saudi Arabia's oil installations. If confirmed, that might be a warning from Tehran that if Larijani's willingness to negotiate isn't taken seriously, Iran can play more hardball in the Gulf.

According to TIME's sources in Tehran, Larijani sees the two-page “Gentlemen's Agreement” as a road map for getting out of the impasse with the West. The document insisted on Iran's “inalienable rights” to nuclear technology and energy. But it explicitly accepted the idea of a suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program as demanded by the Bush administration while negotiations resume on finding ways that Iran can satisfy the international community that its nuclear intentions are purely peaceful. As one type of guarantee, Larijani agreed to outside participation in Iran's enrichment activities in the form of an “international consortium.” Whether Solana agreed to the "Agreement" is not important; Larijani continues to see it as the basis for new talks.

I haven't seen the Oct. 1 "Gentlemen's Agreement" published in full anywhere yet, so here it is in the form I received it:

Gentlemen's Agreement

1 October 2006

1. Exercise of inalienable rights of Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire and use the nuclear technology and nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with article 4 of the NPT, including all activities related to nuclear fuel cycle and uranium enrichment, be recognized by EU+3+3.

2. As a member state of IAEA and party to NPT, Islamic Republic of Iran, while being committed to its obligations under the comprehensive safe guard agreement with IAEA, spares no effort to facilitate the IAEA's activities vis a vis its obligations.

3. Verification of the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities will merely be made b[y] the IAEA in accordance with its statute and the NPT.

4. The main negotiation between 3+3 and Iran has to be conducted within a timetable of maximum 3 months. The time duration could be extended upon agreement of both sides.

5. Upon the commencement of the negotiation between Iran 3+3, the nuclear dossier shall be returned from UN security council, in full to the framework of the IAEA.

6. The aim of the negotiation between 3+3 and Iran is not imposition on Iran of any restriction in fulfilling its inalienable right in its pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, including nuclear fuel production and EU+3+3 is fully committed to this aim.

7. The Negotiation in the nuclear area is aimed at finding mutually agreeable mechanisms for acquiring further assurances of the exclusive peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear activities and non-diversion to prohibited purposes.

8. Any decision for any suspension would merely be considered as a good will initiative, which is by no means a precondition for the negotiation being resumed; meaning that it can only go into effect with the sanction Iran removed by 3+3 group announcement in the first round of next main negotiation. Give the above after a period of two months/during which Iran is in a voluntary and non-binding and temporary move avoids installation of next cascades/there will be no restriction on continuation of producing nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes in Iran.

9. Both side agreed that formation of an international consortium/in Iranian enrichment facilities. Can be considered as a useful mechanism for acquiring further assurances on peaceful nature of Iranian Nuclear program.

10. the nine above mentioned points were agreed upon by Dr. Larijani and Dr. Solana an[d] plenipotentiary representatives of I.R. of Iran and countries of 3+3 respectively, as the principles of understanding and basis of negotiations between Iran and 3+3/to be announced upon holding the first round of negotiations.

11. Both side agreed to maintain the confidentially of this agreement prior to the holding of first ministerial meeting.

--By Scott MacLeod/Cairo